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Instead of heuristical heterogeneity assumption in the current heterogeneous agent models (HAMs),
we derive the trading heterogeneity by introducing information uncertainty about the fundamen-
tal value to a HAM. Conditional on their private informationabout the fundamental value, agents
choose different trading strategies when optimizing theirexpected utilities. This provides a micro-
foundation to heterogeneity and switching behavior of agents. We show that the HAM with trading
heterogeneity originating from the incomplete information performs equally well, if not better than
existing HAMs, in generating bubbles, crashes, and mean-reverting prices. The simulated time se-
ries matches with the S&P 500 in terms of power law distribution in returns, volatility clustering
and long memory in volatility.
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1 Introduction
Heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) are useful in explainingfinancial market abnormality such
as bubbles and crashes (Lux, 1995; Brock and Hommes, 1998; Heand Westerhoff, 2005; Huang
et al., 2010). They are also powerful in duplicating and analyzing stylized facts of financial data,
such as fat tails, volatility clustering and long memory (Alfarano et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2012;
He and Li, 2015). More recent evidence suggests that HAMs provide empirical specifications that
outperform random walk and many conventional models (de Jong et al., 2010 and Chiarella et
al., 2012, Lof, 2015). The explanatory power of the existingHAMs mainly comes from exploring
market mechanism by focusing more on the interaction among heterogeneous agents, but less so on
the role of information friction. In particular, the HAM literature assumes a complete information
about the fundamental value of risky assets. It is well recognized that information friction plays a
very important role in explaining various puzzles and anomalies in financial markets.1
This paper aims to examine the joint role of heterogeneity and information uncertainty in fi-
nancial markets. It contributes to the HAMs by providing an endogenous mechanism on trading
heterogeneity among agents and a micro-foundation to heterogeneity and switching behavior of
agents. More explicitly, we consider a HAM in which agents face information uncertainty by
receiving private noisy signals about the fundamental value of a risky asset when entering the mar-
ket. Due to the uncertainty about the fundamental value and well-documented price momentum
in short-run, agents consider both trading strategies based on the private information and short-run
momentum when making their investment decision. Conditional public information of history
price and his private signal, an agent chooses the trading strategy that maximizes his expected util-
ity. This leads to endogenous heterogeneity and switching behavior of agents’ choices. We show
that the HAM with trading heterogeneity originating from the information uncertainty performs
equally well, if not better than existing HAMs, in generating bubbles, crashes, and mean-reverting
1There is a growing literature that deviates from the standard fundamentalist-chartist setup. For example, Parke
and Waters (2007) allow agents to utilize different subsetsof he complete information, Kasa et al. (2014) introduce
two information sets about the fundamental that are translated into heterogeneous beliefs.
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prices. Numerical analysis shows that the model is able to match with the S&P 500 in terms of
power-law distribution in returns, volatility clusteringand long memory in volatility.
This paper is closely related to the current HAMs with respect to heterogeneity and switching
behavior of agents. However, different from the current HAMs, the heterogeneity of agents in
this paper is characterized by agents’ choices between two typical trading strategies based on the
long-run reversal (to the fundamentals) and short-run momentum (in price trend), the two most
prominent financial market anomalies (see, for example, Poterba and Summers, 1988; Jagadeesh
and Titman, 1993 and Moskowitz et al., 2012). Despite the success HAMs have achieved, many re-
main skeptical about this approach arguing that they rely onto many heuristic assumptions. Most
of the existing HAMs either exogenously specify whether an agent is a fundamentalist or chartist
(Frankel and Froot, 1990; Day and Huang, 1990) or assume thatagents have a complete informa-
tion about the fundamental value and switch from one type to another based on some performance
measures. In the seminal work of Brock and Hommes (1998), agents switch evolutionarily to
the strategy that generates higher past realized profit following a discrete choice probability func-
tion. Because of the complete information, agents are able to compare the performance of the two
commonly used strategies and switch to better performed strategies. Such an approach is widely
applied with different customized switching criteria in sub equent studies.2 These studies innova-
tively capture the behavioral aspects of trading and model how agents change their strategy over
time, focusing more on the market mechanism of heterogeneous trading on market inefficiency
but less (or nor) on the role of information uncertainty. Therefore they are limited to explain why
not all agents from the same group switch to better-performing strategies with certainty. If the
information is complete, should not all agents cluster to the strategy that is expected to perform
better?
This paper aims to provide a micro-foundation on trading heterogeneity and switching behav-
ior of agents’ choices by considering information uncertainty and agents’ optimal trading decision
2See for example, de Jong et al. (2010), and Jongen et al. (2012). For other switching mechanism, see Chiarella
et al. (2012) that model the fraction of fundamentalists as aMarkov process conditional on some unobserved market
conditions, i.e. booms and burst states; Lof (2012) that updates the fractions of fundamentalists and chartists according
to a discrete function of the real business cycles.
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facing the uncertainty. In this paper, agents are not heterogeneous by nature, experience or ran-
domness. Instead, we assume a continuum of agents who have incomplete information about the
fundamental value. Each agent receives a noisy and private signal about the fundamental value
when entering the market. Because of the information uncertainty about the fundamental value,
agents make their decision by considering trading strategies based on both public and private in-
formation.3 Therefore, agents are allowed to choose either fundamentaltrading strategy based on
the private information or chartist trading strategy basedon public information and price trend.
Conditional on the public information and his private signal, e ch agent chooses the strategy that
generates a higher expected utility. Due to the informationdispersion, agents may choose dif-
ferent trading strategies, generating cross-sectional trading heterogeneity among agents. Instead
of switching exogenously based on certain probability, agents switch their choices on the trading
strategies endogenously based on their information and theoptimal trading. As market prices and
agents’ private information change, the market fractions of agents choosing particular strategies
vary over time. As a result, both cross-sectional and time-varying trading heterogeneity arise.
Representing enumerable strategies with fundamental and chartist trading strategies is on the
one hand motivated by the survey finding (Allen and Taylor, 1990) that most investors, especially
institutional investors, conduct both fundamental and technical analysis. On the other hand, this is
also motivated by the long-run mean-reversal and short-runmomentum in prices, the two market
anomalies observed widely across various financial markets. It also follows from the conventional
setup in HAMs. Even though agents are well-informed about the fundamental value, because of
the information uncertainty about the fundamental value, an agent may choose chartist strategy
when it is expected to generate higher expected utility conditional on public information and his
private signal. In particular, when mispricing based on theprivate information is expected to
be small, a fundamental trading strategy may lead to a lower expected utility, while a short-run
momentum strategy may lead to a higher expected utility, which motivates agents to choose chartist
3With complete information assumption in the current HAMs, agents are able to compare the performance of dif-
ferent trading strategies. However, facing the information uncertainty, it makes agents more difficult, if not impossible,
to compare the performance of these two strategies and choose the better performed one.
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strategy. Among various trading strategies based on the public information, we choose momentum
strategy which is widely used in the HAMs and well supported by empirical evidence on short-run
momentum. As a result, the fractions of agents who choose fundamental and momentum strategies
are uniquely determined by the distribution of the private signals and the past asset prices.
In our model, the market fraction of agents who choose the fundamental trading strategy gener-
ally increases with the degree of asset mispricing, but declin s with the market power of agents who
choose momentum strategy. Here the degree of mispricing is measured by the absolute difference
between market price and the expected fundamental value, while the market power is measured
by the absolute difference between market price and a referenc price or price trend. As the mar-
ket price and private signals change, the fraction of agentswho choose the fundamental trading
strategy fluctuates, which affects the comparative advantage of the two strategies and hence the
aggregate demand of agents. This in turn has a feedback effect on the magnitude and direction of
the future price movements, generating rich price dynamic patterns. We show that the explanatory
power of the model developed in this paper remains robust with information uncertainty compared
to the current HAMs. In particular, the price dynamics generate occasional booms and bursts of
bubbles, as well as transitions between bubbles and recessions. The simulated time series exhibit
the power-law distribution in returns, volatility clustering and long memory, which are commonly
observed properties in financial market returns and volatility.
2 The Model
We consider a continuum[0,1] of agents trading on one risky asset and one risk-free asset in
discrete-time. For simplicity, the interest rate of the risk-free asset is normalized to zero. The
fundamental value of the risky assetµ is not known publicly. Agents only know thatµ is normally
distributed with mean of̄µ and standard deviation ofσµ . Denoteαµ = 1/σ2µ the precision of the
distribution of the fundamental valueµ. In each time period, there is a new entry of agents4 and
4Different from the existing HAMS, we allow agents to come, stay, or leave the market at any point of time.
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each agenti receives a private signal on the fundamental valueµ, given by
xi,t = µ + εi,t,
where the noise termεi,t is independently and normally distributed with mean 0 and a standard
deviation ofσx, across agents and over time. Similarly denoteαx = 1/σ2x the precision of agents’
signals. This implies that the private signals are normallydistributed with a mean ofµ and a
variance of 1/αx. All agents have a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) exponential utility
function
U (Wi,t) =−exp(−AWi,t) ,
whereA is the common absolute risk aversion coefficient for all agents a dWi,t is the wealth of
agenti in time t. Let pt be the (cum-)market price of the risky asset and denoteIt = {pt , pt−1, · · ·}
the public information of history price. Each agent seeks tomaximize the expected utility by
allocating her wealth between risky and risk-free assets conditi nal on the public informationIt−1
and her private signalxi,t about the fundamental value of the risky asset. Letqi,t be agenti’s
demand of the risky asset at timet. Then the expected utility of the agent becomes



















whereE(pt |xi,t , It−1) andVar(pt |xi,t, It−1) are agenti’s prediction about the price and variance of
the risky asset conditional on the public informationIt−1 and her signalxi,t . The maximization of
the expected utility leads to agenti’s optimal demand
qi,t =




Note thatqi,t is independent of the agent’s wealth but relies on her predict future price movement.
It is an increasing function of the predicted price change,E(pt |xi,t, It−1)− pt−1, and a decreasing
function of the price volatilityVar(pt |xi,t, It−1).
Facing the information uncertainty on the fundamental value, an agent considers both the long-
run mean-reverting of the market price to the fundamental value nd the short-run momentum in
price trend when entering the market. Correspondingly, theagent considers both fundamental and
momentum trading strategies based on the public information of the history price and her private
signal about the fundamental value of the risky asset. More explicitly, the predicted price and
variance based on fundamental trading strategy are








whereγ ∈ (0,1] is a constant. Note thatαµ µ̄+αxxi,tαµ+αx and
1
αµ+αx are agenti’s posterior updating of
the mean and variance, respectively, of the fundamental value of the risky asset conditional on her
signalxi,t . Condition (3) means that the predicted price is a weight average of the latest market
price and the posterior updating of the fundamental value conditi nal on her private signalxi,t ;
while (4) means that the conditional variance is proportional to the posterior variance conditional
on the private signalxi,t . In particular, whenγ = 1, the conditional mean and variance (3)-(4) are
reduced to the posterior mean and variance respectively. Conditi n (3) can also be written as







Thereforeγ measures the convergence rate of the market price to the expect d fundamental value.
A high γ means a quick convergence to the expected fundamental value. Therefore the fundamental
trading strategy reflects agent’s belief that the future price is expected to converge to the expected
fundamental value. Though the private signalsxi,t are i.i.d. across agents and over time, they are
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partially incorporated through the current market pricespt , which is then reflected in the prediction
of the future price. This set up is different from the rational equilibrium model in which the
expected price equals to its fundamental value in the next period. Consequently, following from
(2)-(4), the optimal demand of the risky asset based on the fundamental analysis becomes
qfi,t =







which is called the fundamental trading strategyf .
The predicted price and variance based on momentum trading are independent of the private
signalxi,t ,
Ec(pt |xi,t , It−1) = pt−1+β (pt−1−vt) , Varc(pt |xi,t , It−1) = σ2t−1, (6)
wherevt is a reference price or a price trend,β measures the extrapolation of the price deviation
from the trend, andσ2t−1 is a heuristic prediction on the variance of the asset price.Th reference
pricevt can be a moving average, a supporting (resistance) price level, or any index derived from





which is called momentum strategyc. In particular, whenvt is a moving average of history
price andβ > (<)0, the strategyc is essentially a time-series momentum (contrarian) strategy
(Moskowitz et al., 2012). For now, we keep the specification of vt pen in order to keep the model
general.
Given the information uncertainty, the agent compares the exp cted value functions based on
the two optimal trading strategies and chooses the one with relative higher value function. More
explicitly, the agent firstly calculates the respective value functions based on strategyf and c,
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which can be obtained by substituting Eqs.(5) and 7) into Eq.(1)



























The agent then compares the value functions of the two strategies and selects the one that yields
a higher value function. Note thatE fi,t is an increasing function of the absolute value of the signal
|xi,t|, while Eci is independent ofxi,t . Therefore there exists threshold values for the private signal
such thatE fi,t = E
c
i,t . Let x̄t be the threshold signal value that makes agenti i different between




































In the case whenE fi,t (U) = E
c
i,t (U), an agent is indifferent between choosing strategiesf andc
and we assume that she chooses strategyf . Then, whenpt−1 = vt , all agents choose strategyf . If
pt−1 6= vt , then the agent chooses strategyc if her signal falls into the interval(xmt ,xMt ) and strategy














qfi,t if xi,t ≤ xmt or xi,t ≥ xMt ;
qci,t if xi,t ∈ (xmt ,xMt ).
(9)
Intuitively, when agent’s private signal is near the mean fudamental value, the private informa-
tion of the agent becomes less valuable (in terms of the valuefunction based on the fundamental
strategy) and the agent tends to choose momentum strategy which is expected to generate a higher
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utility. However, when agent’s private signal is far away from the mean fundamental value, the pri-
vate information of the agent becomes more valuable and the agent favor the fundamental trading
strategy. For convenience, we call agenti fundamentalist if she chooses the fundamental strategy
so thatqi,t = q
f
i,t and chartist if she chooses the momentum strategy so thatqi,t = q
c
i,t. An agenti
chooses to be a fundamentalists if her signal is in the tails of the distribution such thatxi,t ≤ xmt or
xi,t ≥ xMt , and a chartist otherwise.
Recall thatxi,t ∼ N(µ,1/αx). Let
yi,t =
√




















αx(xmt −µ), yMt =
√
αx(xMt −µ).







qfi,t if yi,t ≤ ymt or yi,t ≥ xMt ;
qci,t if yi,t ∈ (ymt ,yMt ),
(11)
in whichxi,t in (9) is replaced byxi,t = µ +yi,t/
√
αx. The standard normal probability density and













t ). Denotemt the fraction of the chartists, then
mt = Φ(yMt )−Φ(ymt ). (13)
Note thatdmt/dt = φ(yMt )−φ(ymt ). As the market consists of fundamentalists and chartists only,
the fraction of fundamentalists becomes 1−mt .
Different from the existing HAMs where the fundamentalistsshare the same demand function,
in this paper, because of the information dispersion, the fundamentalists have different demand
functions corresponding to their different signals on the fundamental values. With equation (9)
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[φ(yMt )−φ(ymt )]+ [1−mt]






To determine the market price, we follow Day and Huang (1990)and assume that a maker maker
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adjusts the price according to
pt = pt−1+λ (Dt +St), (14)
whereλ > 0 measures the impact of marginal aggregate demand on the asset price, andSt ∼
N(0,σ2s ) is an exogenous supply of the risky asset5. The price updating mechanism suggests that
the price goes up in the next period ifDt +St > 0, declines or remains constant otherwise.
In the absence of supply shock (that isSt = 0) and all the agents use the fundamental strategy
(that ismt = 0), the market equilibrium price under the Walrasian auctioneer scenario reaches an





Note thatµ may not necessarily equal tōµ due to the information uncertainty. Therefore the
equilibrium pricep∗ may not necessarily equal to the fundamental valueµ even if all agents are
acting as fundamentalists. The equilibrium price is above the fundamental value ifµ < µ̄ , below
the fundamental ifµ > µ̄ and equivalent to the fundamental ifµ = µ̄ . The potential difference
between the equilibrium pricep∗ and the fundamental valueµ is caused by the imperfect informa-
tion. In our model, even in the absence of supply shock, thereare two origins of asset mispricing,
the information uncertainty about the fundamental value and the presence of chartists.
To better understand the dynamics of the market price (14), we now consider a simple deter-
ministic model of (14) when there is no supply shock,σ2t−1 = σ














It is easy to see that the fundamental equilibrium pricep∗ defined in (15) is the unique fixed point
of (16) and its stability can be characterized by the following proposition.
5Alternatively,St can be interpreted as the demand of the noise trader as in Black (1986).
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Proposition 1 The fundamental equilibrium price p∗ of the price dynamics(16) is locally stable





In addition, the loss of stability leads to a flip bifurcationwhenλ αµ+αxAγ = 2.
Proposition 1 shows that the stability of the fundamental value is maintained with small pre-
cisions of the noisy processes. This implies that less noisein the fundamental information can
contribute toward instability of the fundamental value, leading to high price volatility even when
the equilibrium is unique. Intuitively, when the dispersion of the fundamental information becomes
small, the fundamental information become more accurate but less valuable while the momentum
trading strategy becomes more popular among the agents, which then leads to instability and high
volatility. This result is consistent with the literature on coordination game with imperfect infor-
mation such as Angeletos and Werning (2006). Proposition 1 also shows that the price dynamics of
such a deterministic model can switch from stable fundamental value to two-period cycle and then
to more complicated behavior. Figure 1 illustrates the bifurcation plot of the price with respect to
γ, the speed that price is expected to converge to the fundament l. It shows that, as the speed of
the convergence of the expected price to the fundamental in the fundamental strategy increases, the
price becomes more stable. This analysis on the deterministic model provides some insight into
the price dynamics of the stochastic model to be discussed inthe following.
3 Implications of Trading Heterogeneity
The model characterizes the endogenous trading heterogeneity among agents when facing infor-
mation uncertainty. The agent that seeks to maximize her expected utility may choose different
strategies simply because either her signal or the market price has changed over time. Note that
the two threshold valuesx±t are time varying. Because of the price change, an agent may choose
different strategy even if she receives the same signal. As we are interested in the evolution in the
market fractions of agents choosing the fundamental and momentum strategies, it is sufficient to
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Figure 1: Bifurcation analysis. The price converges to the fix d point p∗ = αxµ+αµ µ̄αµ+αx when γ
increases to the extent that it satisfies the stability condition thatλ αµ+αxAγ < 2. The parameter used
for the bifurcation isp0 = 950, p1 = 954, σ2s ≡ 1,µ̄ = µ = 1000,β = 0.004, 1/αu = 4× 104,
1/αx = 8×104 andλ = 2.3.
know the distribution of the signals instead of every agent’s signal. Below we illustrate how various
factors affect the evolution of the fraction of the chartists,mt , over various ranges of prices. Unless
specified otherwise, we use the following set of parameters:µ̄ = µ = 1000,γ = 0.4, β = 0.9,
1/αµ = 4×104, 1/αx = 8×104, λ = 2.3, pt−1−vt = 3,σ2t−1 ≡ 1,A= 1 andσ2s ≡ 0.
3.1 The Impact of Mispricing
We first examine the impact of mispricing. As shown by Figure 2, the fraction of chartistsmt
decreases as the price deviates more from the fundamentalµ (for both values in|pt−1−vt | andβ ).
In another words, agents’ choose to the fundamental strategy increase with the degree of mispricing











This, together with (13), implies that∂ (mt)/∂ (|pt−1−µ|)< 0, meaning that the fraction of agents
choosing the momentum strategy decreases as the mispricingin reases. This result is illustrated
in Fig. 2 with respect to different price trend|pt−1− vt | and extrapolationβ of the momentum
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pt−1 − vt = 3
pt−1 − vt = 2
(a)











Figure 2: The effect of mispricing|pt−1−µ| and momentum trading on the fraction of the chartists
mt with (a) two different price trend|pt−1− vt | = 3 and 5; and (b) two different extrapolation
β = 0.9 and 1.2.
trading strategy. It shows thatmt is close to 1 when the pricept−1 is near the fundamental value
µ = 1000, meaning most of the agents choose the momentum strategy. However,mt decreases
as the pricept−1 deviates from the fundamental valueµ, meaning that more agents choose the
fundamental strategy. This suggests that it is unlikely forthe price to deviate far away from its
value infinitely. All the others being the same, the price reve ts towards its fundamental value
when it is significantly mispriced, any bubble eventually bursts and recession eventually recovers
as significant mispricing trigger agents to choose the fundamental strategy that drive the price to-
wards its fundamental value. Such nonlinear mean-reverting price movements are consistent with
De Grauwe et al. (1993), Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007), Bauer et al. (2009), Dieci and
Westerhoff (2010), among many others. Most studies derive the mean-reverting price behavior by
assuming the distribution of fundamentalists and chartists in different market states similar to Fig-
ure 2. The model developed in this paper provides a micro-foundation to the endogenize switching
of the choices between heterogeneous strategies as a conseque c of utility maximization under
information friction.6
6We would like to thank the Associate Editor for emphasizing this contribution to the current HAMs.
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3.2 The Impact of Momentum Trading
We further examine the impact of the market power of momentumtrading on the fractionmt . Recall
from Eq.(7) that all momentum strategy shares the same demand function. The market power of
the momentum trading can be measured by|pt−1−vt | and the extrapolationβ of the momentum
strategy. Based on (9) and (10), an increase in|pt−1−vt | andβ enlarges the interval(xmi ,xMi ). This
means that, as the market power of the momentum trading increases, there are less extreme signals
outside of the interval and hence more agents choose the momentu trading strategy, leading to
highermt . This result is illustrated in Figure 2. In (a), we comparemt for two different values of
|pt−1− vt |. The solid curve representsmt with relatively large|pt−1−vt | = 3, while the dashed
curve describesmt with relatively small|pt−1−vt | = 2. We observe from Figure 2(a) that, given
the samept−1, mt is larger when|pt−1−vt | is higher. We have the same observation in Figure 2(b)
with respect to the extrapolationβ of the momentum trading.
The above analysis suggests that, on the one hand, the greater the market power of the momen-
tum trading, the higher the market fraction of chartistsmt is, which may destabilize the market
price, leading to significant mis-pricing. This destabilizing role of the momentum trading is con-
sistent with the current HAMs. On the other hand, based on theprevious discussion, a significant
mis-pricing motivates more agents to choose the fundamental strategy, driving the market price to-
wards the fundamental value. This endogenous“self-correction”mechanism of the market is very
different from the current HAMs where market stability depends exogenously on the balanced
activities from the fundamentalists and chartists.
3.3 Market Fractions under Regime-dependent Reference Price
Previously we assume|pt−1−vt | to be exogenously in order to better understand the impact ofthe
market power of momentum trading on market price. In the literature, the reference pricevt of the
momentum strategy is usually a function of the historical price and can be different over different
price range. We follow Huang, et al. (2010, 2012) and definevt as regime-dependent reference
price. In particular, we divide the price domainP= [pmin, pmax] equally inton mutually exclusive
15





Figure 3: The impact of regime-dependentvt onmt .
regimes such that
P= ∪nj=1P j = [0,κ)∪ [κ ,2κ)∪· · ·∪ [(n−1)κ ,nκ ],
where jκ ( j = 1,2...,n.) represents psychological threshold corresponding to different support
(resistance) level in the chartist analysis. Whenpt−1 is observed,vt is extrapolated to be in the
middle of the trading window thatpt−1 falls into, that is:
vt = (⌊pt−1/κ⌋+ ⌈pt−1/κ⌉) ·κ/2. (19)
where⌊pt−1/κ⌋ and⌈pt−1/κ⌉ are the lower and upper bounds of the regime that enclosept−1.
Let κ = 100, based on the regime-dependentvt , we plotmt againstpt−1 in Fig. 3. It shows
that, as the price changes, the fraction of chartistsmt changes between 1 and 0 frequently. When
pt−1 is relatively close to the center of the regimevt , the market power of the momentum trading
is weak andmt moves towards 0. Otherwise, whenpt−1 is on the boundary of the regime,mt
changes towards 1. As the price changes from one regime to anoher, the regime-dependentvt
updates accordingly, which changesmt accordingly. Such regime-dependentvt makes agents more
sensitive to the price changes and introduces more volatility to mt by enhancing the switching
between choosing the two strategies.
As vt is a function of the past price, the price dynamics is essentially one-dimension. Such a
model is nonlinear, maybe even chaotic, which is capable of gnerating rich price dynamic patterns.
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Figure 4: The phase diagram ofpt andpt+1.
Given the complexity of the model, we illustrate a typical phase diagram of the model in Figure
4, with κ = 200,αx = 1/200,αµ = 1/100 and other parameters given in the standard parameter
set. The asterisk-marked curve captures the phase line thatmapspt−1 to pt . It cross the 45 degree
line on whichpt−1 = pt several times, suggesting that there are multiple equilibria. Moreover,
when the price is significantly higher than the fundamental value (µ = 1000), the phase line is
always below the 45 degree line, which means that the price will subsequently decline when it is
sufficiently overpriced. In particular, given anypt−1 that is sufficiently higher than the fundamental
value, it is observed from Figure 4 thatpt < pt−1. This is because, when the asset is significantly
overpriced, agents cluster almost entirely to be fundamentalists (see Figure 2), which drives the
price down towards its fundamental value. Similarly, when the price is significantly lower than
the fundamental value, the phase line is above the 45 degree line, indicating that the price will
subsequently rebounds when it is sufficiently underpriced.The result is driven by agents clustering
to fundamentalists when the asset is significantly underpriced. When market price is not far away
from the fundamental value, the trading is dominated by momentum strategy, which increases
price fluctuation, indicating by the significant upward piece-wise phase lines when price is around
the fundamental vale (µ = 1000). This again illustrates the price fluctuations and endogenous
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self-correction when the market price deviates far away from the fundamental value.
4 Time Series Properties and the Stylized Facts
The current literature on HAMs is powerful in reproducing commonly observed financial market
abnormalities that cannot be justified by efficient market hypothesis. In this section, we explore the
time series properties numerically and in particular focuson whether our HAM with endogenous
heterogeneity can also generate the stylized facts in financial time series. We test for the non-
normality, fat tails and volatility clustering in returns.We also examine whether the return series
exhibit the power-law distribution and long-memory process (or long-range dependence), which
are widely observed in financial markets.
To understand the effect of the stochastic noise, we simulate two price series, one with and one
without stochastic supply shock. In the absence of the supply shock, the model is deterministic.
A deterministic data generating process is unrealistic given that the price is largely unpredictable,
however it provides a good way to understand the performanceof the model. Note that these
stylized facts are commonly observed across internationalfi ncial markets over decades while
exogenous shocks are random, they are more likely driven by some endogenous price dynamics
instead of random shocks. Therefore we are interested in if the deterministic model helps to gener-
ate these stylized facts. In general, as shown in He and Li (2007), it is the interaction between the
underlying deterministic dynamics and noise that characteistics the realistic time series properties.
To see how well the simulated data matches with the real data in terms of statistical and qual-
itative properties, we benchmark for each stylized fact based on the daily price of S&P 500 index
from August 28, 2006 to August 7, 2014. The compounded single-period return of the risky asset
from t −1 to t is defined asrt = log(pt)− log(pt−1). To differentiate the time series generated
from the S&P 500 index (SP), the simulation based on deterministic model (SD) and the simu-
lation based on stochastic model (SS), we add SP, SD and SS in front of the name of each time
series. For example SPpt , SD pt and SSpt denote respectively the price of S&P 500 index, the
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simulation of the deterministic and the stochastic models respectively. Similarly, SPrt , SD rt and
SSrt denote the log returns based on the three price series SPpt , SD pt and SSpt .
The set of parameters used to simulate the deterministic andstochastic price is common:p0 =
1295.09, κ = 43.891,σ2s ≡ 1 and the other parameters are the same with the standard paramete
setS: µ̄ = µ = 1000,γ = 0.4, β = 0.9, 1/αu = 4× 104, 1/αx = 8×104, A = 1 andλ = 2.3.7
The parameter value ofp0 equals to the first observation of the S&P 500 sample, and thatof
µ̄ andµ is broadly calibrated with the average fundamental value ofS&P 500 calculated based
on Gordon growth model. Among the other parameters,β , γ, λ , αu andαx , we focus on the
two key behavior parametersγ andβ later. We use this standard parameter set throughout the
paper, unless specified otherwise. As our purpose is to illustrate if the model has the capability to
generate various stylized facts as the conventional HAMs do, we focus on typical deterministic and
stochastic simulated price series. A Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity analysis are conducted
to analyze the impact of the two key behavior parametersβ andγ later.
4.1 Time Series Properties
Before examining the stylized facts, we first present some tiseries properties on price and
return. Figure 5 plots time series of the prices and returns of the index and a typical simulation.
Although the price trajectories for the three price series of (a) the indexSPpt , (c) the deterministic
modelSDpt and (e) the stochastic modelSSpt look quite different, we do observe commonly that
the prices move up and down with occasional bubbles and crashes. For the simulated prices, even
though the fundamental value is constant, the price are quitvolatile, suggesting the presence of
excess volatility. The results are consistent with the empirical evidence documented in Ebrahim
and Mathur (2001), Taylor (2007) and early HAMs for example Lux (1995). The commonly shared
features by the corresponding three return series in (b), (d) an (f) are: (i) the return moves around
zero; (ii) high and low volatility tend to cluster together,suggesting that small (large) changes in
returns tend to be followed by small (large) changes in return; and (iii) returns are generally more
7Note that the parameterσ2s is abandoned when simulating the deterministic price.
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Figure 5: The time series of prices and returns on the S&P500 index (top panel), the simulation
from the deterministic model (middle panel), and the simulation from the stochastic model (bottom
panel).
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volatile when the price declines. The results suggest that simulations based on our model share
some of the time series properties of the real return patterns documented in existing literature.
Table 1 summarizes the statistical properties of returns. In line with the S&P 500 index, returns
generated from the deterministic and stochastic models have negative skewness and high kurtosis.
The negative skewness suggests that extremely negative returns are more likely to happen than
extremely positive returns. The large kurtosis suggests the presence of fat tails, that is, the extreme
returns appear more frequently than what are predicted by the normal distribution. These features
suggests that the returns are not normal. This is further supported by p-value of the Jarque-Bera
test, which rejects the null hypothesis that either SPrt , or SDrt or SSrt is normally distributed.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Returns. This table reports the summary statistics, including mean,
standard deviation (sd), skewness, kurtosis, and the p-value of the Jarque-Bera test, of the re-
turn series of S&P500 index (SPrt), the simulated deterministic model (SDrt) and the simulated
stochastic model (SSrt).
mean sd min max skewness kurtosis p-value
SPrt 0.000 0.014 -0.095 0.110 -0.325 12.525 0.000
SD rt -0.000 0.012 -0.065 0.068 -0.347 8.515 0.000
SSrt 0.000 0.042 -0.328 0.355 -0.211 19.327 0.000
The above results suggest that the model is able to generate ralistic time series observed in the
S&P500. They are however very sketchy and basic. To explore further the statistics of the model
and compare with the S&P500 index, we conduct econometric tests o study the degree of volatility
clustering, the heaviness of the tails, and the distribution of returns. In paricular, we examine the
short-term and long-term features of the price movements and study the long-memory process and
long-range dependence.
4.2 The Power Law of Returns
Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the tail distribution of return is well approx-
imated by the power law (Gabaix et al., 2003, 2006). In particular the distribution of returns is
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= −ζ lnX + b, whereζ ≃ 3 is the Pareto exponent. This table reports the




















ζ 2.981∗∗∗ 3.086∗∗∗ 2.681∗∗∗
(14.649) (12.924) (12.988)
N 55 55 55
R2 0.799 0.756 0.758















∼ X−ζ , (20)




is the normalized return, and∼ denotes asymptotic equality up to numerical
constants. In Gabaix (2003, 2006), the estimation resultζ ≃ 3 is obtained by lettingX take a range
















We follow the same methodology to test whether the simulatedreturns exhibit such a power-
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X), we estimate Eq.(21) with OLS for each return series. The estimation results are reported in
Table 2. It shows that, like the tail distribution of SPrt , both SDrt and SSrt have a power exponent
ζ of around 3. The fact that estimation coefficients ofζ ≃ 3 confirms the presence of power-law
distribution in both the index and simulated return series.
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4.3 Volatility Clustering, Long Memory, and Leverage Effect
As documented in Cont (2001), the autocorrelations functio(ACF) of returns are insignificant but
different measures of volatility, such as absolute or square returns, exhibit positive and persistent
ACFs. We report the ACFs in Figure 6. The trivial ACFs of returns suggest that past return is not
necessarily informative for future return. The significantly positive ACFs of volatility measures
imply that periods of quiescence and turbulence tend to cluster together. Panels (a)-(c) of Figure
6 demonstrate these characteristics of volatility clustering by piloting ACFs as a function of the
number of lags. For the S&P 500, deterministic and stochastic simulations, there are no significant
and decaying ACFs in return (apart from the first lag), but theACFs of the absolute returns and
squared returns are relatively large and persistent even aft r 100 lags.
To see how persistent the volatility is, we follow Cont (2001) to estimate the following power





∣ , |rt |)≃ ς/qd, (22)
whereq is the number of lags,ς is a parameter that captures the ACF of absolute returns withlag
one, andd is the power exponent that captures how fast the ACFs decay. For each of the time series
of returns, we first obtain the ACFs of the absolute returns for q= 1,2, . . .200, and then estimate













∣ , |rt |) denote the ACFs of absolute returns of SPrt , SDrt and SSrt respectively. Table 3
presents the estimation results. We find that the ACFs of absolute returns of S&P 500, deterministic
and stochastic simulations, decay with exponents of 0.368, 0.417 and 0.205 respectively. The
results are roughly consistent with the empirical evidencethatd generally falls into[0.2,0.4] (see
Cont, 2001).
Long memory and long range dependence are synonymous notions that are used interchange-
ably in the literature. Volatility clustering is an indicator of long memory but it does not necessarily
lead to long memory. Following the standard definition in Tsay (2010, Chapter 2) and Campbell,
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Figure 6: Volatility clustering and Long Memory. Panel (a) plots the autocorrelations function
(ACFs) of returns (solid line), absolute returns (asteriskmarked line) and squared returns (dotted
line) for S&P500 index against the number of lag. Panel (b) and (c) plots similar statistics based
on returns of simulation from deterministic and stochasticmodel respectively. Panel (d) plots the
Lo modified R/S statistic of the absolute returns.



















d .368∗∗∗ .417∗∗∗ .205∗∗∗
(21.015) (51.367) (23.461)
ς .605∗∗∗ .916∗∗∗ .658∗∗∗
N 200 200 200
R2 .866 .966 .974
Root MSE .058 .037 .046
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Lo and MacKinlay (1997, Chapter 2), the time seriesxt is said to be long-memory9 if
(1−L)d xt = εt ,
whereL is the lag operator,d ∈ (−0.5,0.5) is the memory parameter that measures the extent of
the memory or long range dependence in{xt}, and{εt} is a white noise series. The long-memory
time seriesxt is said to be fractionally differenced of orderd. It is neither stationary, where the
ACF declines exponentially, nor is it a unit root, where the ACF decays linearly. Such a long-
memory process is characterized with small and slowly-decay d ACFs. The decay of ACFs in
long-memory process is much faster than in the unit root process for the first lag, but slower for
larger lags. Whend ∈ (−0.5,0.5) andq→ ∞, the ACFs of{xt} fades away at a polynomial rate as
the lag increases such that:
corr(xt ,xt+q)∽ f (q)/q
1−2d,
where f (q) is any slowly varying function at infinity, verifyingf (aq)/ f (q)→ 1 for anya> 0, as
the number of lagq→ ∞.
As documented in Christensen and Nielsen (2007), Christensen, et al. (2010), Bollerslev, et al.
(2013), Rossi and Santucci de Magistris (2013), among many others, the stock market volatility
has long memory. The phenomenon of volatility clustering discussed above is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the existence of long memory. We nowf rmally test the existence of long
memory in the volatility measured by the time series of|rt |. The methodology that we apply is the
range over standard deviation or R/S statistic modified by Lo(1991) that corrects for the effects of
short-range dependence10.
We test for the null hypothesis that there is no long memory ifthe estimated R/S statistic falls
out of the critical interval. The result rejects the null hypothesis and provides evidence that the
time series is long-memory. As the Lo modified R/S statistic does not provide a criteria for the
9Baillie (1996) provides an extensive survey on the definitioof long memory.
10The other commonly used methodologies is the semiparametric estimator of log periodogram (LP) regression,
represented by Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983), Phillips (2007) and Robinson (1995).
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Figure 7: The leverage effect. This figure plots the degree ofleverage effect measured by
corr(r2t+q, rt).
selection of the optimal lag and the R/S statistic maybe sensitive to the selection of lags. We report
the R/S statistic for lags ranging from 1 to 100 and graph it inPa el (d) of Figure 6. When the
number of lags is not too large, i.e.q< 30, the Lo modified R/S statistic for SP|rt |, SD |rt | and
SS|rt | all fall out of the 95% critical interval[0.809,1.862], which suggests the existence of long
memory in both the real and simulated absolute return series.
Other than volatility clustering and long memory, we also observe from Fig. 5 that volatility
tends to become higher as price declines and lower as the pricrises. The negative correlation
between volatility and returns is called leverage effect orvolatility asymmetry (Bouchaud, et al.,
2001 and Pagan, 1996). Represent the volatility with absolute returns, for each of the three return
series, we calculatecorr(r2t+q, rt) for q = 0,1,2, . . .100. Figure 7 plotscorr(r
2
t+q, rt) against the
number of lagq for each return series. It shows that when the number of lag issmall, i.e.q< 7, the
relation between volatility and returns is negative for each of the three time series of return. This
suggests that negative returns are associated with higher contemporary volatility and followed by
higher volatility in the short-term. This implies that the model is able to capture the leverage effect
observed in financial markets.
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4.4 Monte Carlo Analysis
In this section, we conduct a Monte Carlo analysis on the robustness of the results based on the
simulations of the stochastic model. We run 1,000 simulations using the same parameter set. In
each simulation, the exogenous supply shockSt is normally distributed around 0 with a variance
of 1. The realization ofSt takes different random values in the 1000 repeated simulations.11 We
repeat the previous statistical analysis for each valid simulation and summarize the results in Table
4. The last column of Table 4 report these statistics based onthe S&P 500 index. Based on the
mean of these statistics, it remains robust that the stochasti simulation matches with the S&P
500 in terms of the first to fourth moments, power-law distribution, volatility clustering and long
memory. Looking at the 5% confidence interval enclosed by p5 and p95 values, we observe that a
large proportion of our simulation matches with the S&P 500.12
Table 4: Monte Carlo Analysis. This table reports the summary statistics, including mean, standard
deviation (sd), minimum value (min), median value (Med), maximum value (Max), 5th percentile
(p5), and 95th percentile (p95), of the various measures of stylized facts in the first column based
on 634 different time series of returns. The mean, sd, skewness, kurtosis are the first, second, third










−ζ lnX + b, d is a measure of how fast the autocorrelation function decays, R/S statistic is the
Lo-modified test of long-range dependence. The last column reports the corresponding statistics
for S&P 500.
Mean sd Min Med Max p5 p95 SP500
mean 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
sd 0.021 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.071 0.009 0.047 0.014
skewness 0.036 0.218 -3.044 0.025 2.168 -0.102 0.249 -0.325
kurtosis 6.348 9.529 2.124 3.997 126.487 2.541 18.437 12.525
ζ 2.929 0.435 1.542 2.956 3.942 2.124 3.575 2.981
d 0.299 0.130 0.073 0.283 1.094 0.123 0.522 0.368
R/S statistic 6.047 1.518 2.064 5.966 10.096 3.698 8.711 6.716
11The simulation may lead to non-positive price that is not realistic. We drop the simulation that generates any
non-positive price, which may explain the positive skewness on average in Table 4. Eventually, we include in our
sample 634 valid simulations, each of which contains 2000 observations on returns.
12This proportion increases further in the 90% confidence interval (not reported for space constraint). Among the
634 simulated time series of returns, we find 521 (or 82%) of them ave a kurtosis greater than 3, 512 (81%) of them
have a p-value of Jarque-Bera normality test less than 5%, 356 (56%) of them have ad that falls into [0.2,0.4], and
634 (100%) of them have R/S statistic that fall out of[0.809,1.862] when the number of lag is 2.
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Figure 8: The R/S statistics forγ (on the left panel) andβ (on the right panel).
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We are also interested in how the stylized facts depends on the choice of behavior parameters
of the model, in particular, the mean reverting parameterγ of the fundamental strategy and the
extrapolation parameterβ of the momentum strategy.13 We first focus on the R/S statistics since
long memory is found to be the most challenging one among those stylized facts. With the chosen
set of parameters, we varyγ andβ , respectively, from 0.01 to 1 with an interval of 0.01 and run
100 simulations for each value. For each simulated time seri, we calculate its R/S statistics. For
each parameter value, we then calculated the average R/S statistics of the 100 simulated time series
and report the results in Figure 8, illustrating the relation between R/S statistics andγ on the left
panel andβ on the right panel. The results show the evidence of long memory in returns for all
values ofγ andβ (except whenβ ≤ 0.05); all the R/S statistics are greater than the cutoff value
1.862.
We then examine the impact ofγ andβ on volatility clustering, measured by the significant
decaying ACFs. For illustration, we choose three representative values for each ofγ andβ . For
each parameter value, we calculate the average ACFs of 100 simulated returns series for all lags
13The sensitivity analysis in this section means to provide additional evidence on the robustness of the results
presented above and to offer some implications on the relation between key parameters and various statistics and
stylized facts. Note however due to the large number of parameter sets, the nonlinear and complexity nature of the
underlying deterministic model, one should be careful in extending the relation between parameter values and various
statistics documented in this section.
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Figure 9: The autocorrelation functions (ACFs) of absolutere urns forγ = 0.1,0.4,0.7 (on the left
panel) andβ = 0.3,0.6,0.9 (on the right panel).
from 1 to 100 and report the result in Figure 9 forγ on the left panel andβ on the right panel.
For γ = 0.1,0.4 and 0.7, the left panel shows that the decaying pattern of the ACFs are very
similar, indicating that the volatility clustering is not very sensitive to the mean reverting speed
γ. However, the ACFs patters forβ = 0.3,0.6 and 0.9 are very different. It appears that the
stronger the extrapolation parameter of the momentum tradingβ s, the higher the ACFs of absolute
returns (similar evidence is found if we calculate the ACFs of quared returns), indicating that an
increasing in momentum trading enhances volatility clustering.
5 Conclusion
Heterogeneity and bounded rationality are two key characteistics of financial markets. Based
on complete information and some heuristic assumptions, the existing heterogeneous agent mod-
els (HAMs) have been successful in explaining financial market abnormality and stylized facts
of financial data and outperforming random walk and many conventional models. This paper
contributes to the development of this literature by endogenizing heterogeneity of agents’ trading
when agents face information uncertainty. Because of the information dispersion, agents that seek
to maximize their utility may choose different trading strategies in response to changing market
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environment, which generates cross-sectional trading heterogeneity among agents. The choices
of strategies can vary over time due to changes in their private signals and market prices. Conse-
quently, both cross-sectional and time-varying trading heterogeneity arise endogenously. This pro-
vides a micro-foundation to the switching mechanism widelydocumented in the current HAMs.
The model is able to generate transitions between bubbles and recessions and to match the real
data pretty well with respect to the cubic-law distributionn returns, volatility clustering and long
memory, which are commonly observed properties in financialmarket returns and volatility.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
First of all, note that at the steady state equilibrium pricep∗, we haveymt = y
M
t = 0,mt = 0 and






























This leads to the two eigenvalues:




Therefore|Γ2|< 1 if and only if 0< λ αµ+αxAγ <2. In addition, whenλ
αµ+αx
Aγ = 2, we haveΓ2=−1,
leading to a flip bifurcation. This completes the proof.
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